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ABSTRACT 
 
Ethiopia is one of the countries with high fertility, rapidly growing and largely young 
population. At the same time, it is among countries with weak and poorly focused 
population policy. In light of this, this study intended to assess the causation between 
demographic factors and economic development in Ethiopia. To this end, it applied 
vector-error-correction model (VECM) to data on economic, demographic and other 
variables obtained from secondary sources, accompanied by descriptive analysis of the 
relationship of population with HDI, agricultural landholdings and forestland. VECM 
results indicated robust and negative long run relationship between per capita income 
and population growth and a positive one between the former and growth of workers – 
with bidirectional causality in both cases. That is, rises in per capita income reduce the 
growth of (dependent) population and enhance that of workers, and vice versa. 
Conversely, slower growth of population or faster growth of workers raises per capita 
income. Short run relationships turned out to be weak and non-robust to alternative 
model specifications. The descriptive analysis signified inverse associations of 
population growth with landholding, forest coverage and HDI score. These findings point 
to a need for meaningful efforts to incorporate population matters into the policy arena. 
______________________________________________________________________ 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The debate on the relationship between population and development has a long history. 
As Panayotou (2000) discusses in some detail, contrasting views on the issue go back 
to the time of Plato and Aristotle. The same source points out that even in its modern 
version, the debate had existed some years before the very influential 1798 book of 
Thomas Malthus. According to Todaro and Smith (2006), the very aged debate on 
population-development relationship is yet to continue into the future. 
 
Since Malthus‟ 1798 book on population, many scholars have considered the imbalance 
between population and resources in general, and the implications of this imbalance in 
particular, as a serious matter. In words of Singh and Singh (1997: 4), for instance, 
“host of social evils, famines and wars, perpetuation of vicious circle of poverty and 
accordant problems are [more] often than not ascribed to inequilibrium in population-
resource situation.” However, this view is far from indisputable as there are many 
scholars on the other extreme – population optimists – who believe that “it will always 
be possible for the world to absorb more people and reap the economic benefits of a 
larger labor force” Latimer and Kulkarni (2008).  
 
Empirically, studies have failed to suggest an overall dominance of one view over the 
other. The majority of studies on population-development relationship in the 1950s and 
1960s claimed a negative relationship between the two variables with causality running 
from population to development. While these studies had population-alarmist 
conclusions, they differed from early Malthusian position mainly in treating population 
growth as an exogenous variable. By treating population growth as an exogenously 
determined variable, classical economists attributed the negative effect of population 
growth on per capita income to the idea that larger population dilutes the amount of 
physical capital coupled with diminishing marginal returns (Birdsall, 1988; Ehrlich and 
Lui, 1997). Extending such analysis of economic growth through including the role of 
human capital (in line with the endogenous growth theories), Mankiw et al. (1992) have 
also found that population growth negatively affects growth in GDP per capita.    
 
In the late 1970s and during the 1980s, researches began to become less assertive of 
the negative impact of population on development and started to come up with 
conclusions resembling: controlling population growth is likely to help developing 
countries if some conditions are fulfilled. The role of population growth on development 
thus shifted from blaming population growth per se to characterizing population growth 
as a factor enhancing and/or exacerbating the effects of other factors. This less 
pessimistic and less assertive view gained prominence in the 1980s and is usually 
referred to as the revisionist view (Birdsall, 1988; Kelley, 2001). Some in this school 
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have described the major problem of this world to reside not in population but in lack of 
favorable economic policies and good governance, corruption, and unjust distribution of 
resources and opportunities (Merrick, 2002; Todaro and Smith, 2006). The revisionist 
conclusions of the studies in the 1980s may not have come about on themselves, but by 
the keen arguments of and some empirical supports for the optimist view since 1980s 
(Keskinen, 2008). 
 
In general, empirical results regarding population-development debate are mixed. As a 
remark to the discussion of contrasting findings, Nafziger (2006) has forwarded 
“Population growth is likely to hamper growth in the first few decades of the 21st century 
in Africa and parts of South Asia unless economic, population, and environmental 
policies change.” (Nafziger, 2006: 296). 
 
The cause-effect relationship between population and development is not the same 
across the board. Based on the cases of twenty countries, Darrat and Yousif (1999) 
have found evidences of causality running from population to economic development, 
from economic development to population, and in both directions. While population has 
positively affected economic development in more than half of the countries in their 
study, population growth is the effect of economic development for poor countries. 
Countries at low level of development are likely to experience higher population growth, 
and this relationship will tend to vanish and finally disappear as they progress. 
 
The situation in most developing countries, especially those in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
looks less controversial. Even for scholars who hold that population could have either 
positive or negative effects on the economy, this region provides a point in case for the 
negative effect of population on economic development. For those who emphasize 
positive effects of demographic variables, sub-Saharan Africa is a region characterized 
by factors likely to undermine such benefits. In relation to the economic benefits of 
falling fertility and mortality rates and rising share of working-age population – the 
demographic dividend – Bloom et al. (2007) have shown that sub-Saharan Africa has 
the same chance of enjoying this benefit as the rest of the world. However, reaping this 
benefit is conditional on institutional quality and “… the average institutional quality in 
Africa lags significantly behind the average in ROW [the rest of the world]” (Bloom et al., 
2007:20). Despite the equal potential that sub-Saharan Africa has with the rest of the 
world, it is still the case that “While most regions around the world are evolving through 
the demographic transition Africa stands as an outlier” (Bloom et al., 2007:2).  
 
Despite this position of developing countries (particularly sub-Saharan Africa) relative to 
the rest of the world and its policy implications, it seems that international policy 
designers and consultants have chosen to push the issue of population to the periphery. 
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The place of population issues in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) presents 
a point in case. Yousif (2009) presents how the MDGs have played down the 
importance of demographic factors in development efforts. Praising the role of MDGs in 
mobilizing forces for poverty reduction, Fisher and Newman (2011) are also among 
those who criticize the neglect of population – “the missing link” – by these goals. A 
question that logically follows from here is then: Why the neglect to population issues?  
 
An answer to the above question may perhaps reside in the view of international policy 
makers on the population-development debate. Accompanying such a suspicion is the 
changing position of the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) on the issue over 
time. In early days, UNFPA identifies itself with population-pessimism and Malthusian-
based recommendations of birth control through family planning. Overtime, this 
organization has shifted to recommending rights-based access to birth control and the 
significant role of empowering women and educating girls in controlling population size. 
While it still argues in favor of slower population growth, it has been shifting away from 
its presumption that causality runs from population to economic development. In its 
2011 report, UNFPA has forwarded some recommendations that clearly show its shift 
towards considering development as cause and population change as effect. The first 
recommendation on a summarizing page of this report, headed Seven Opportunities for 
a World of 7 Billion, reads: “Reducing poverty and inequality can slow population 
growth.” Similarly, the fourth point forwarded reads: “Ensuring that every child is wanted 
and every childbirth safe can lead to smaller and stronger families” (UNFPA, 2011). 
 
The Ethiopian case seems to mirror this changing global view on population-
development debate. For instance, the neglect of population growth as a policy issue is 
common to most (if not all) reports of the Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Development (MoFED). Even in the limited number of lines devoted to population issue, 
these reports put it in a subsidiary position. In one of such reports, MoFED (2006) – 
after detailing the manifestations of the multi-dimensional successes of the country – 
gives the credit of leading developmental concerns to labor and land productivity. The 
report acknowledges the issue of rapidly growing population as an additional challenge. 
 
The situation in Ethiopia does not look less worrisome than the global or regional 
situation, if not more. A wing of the UN has listed Ethiopia among the top eight countries 
of the world facing current demographic challenges (UNFPA, 2011) at about the same 
time as its other wing is praising Ethiopia as one of the most successful countries in 
terms of HDI score (UNDP, 2011). Besides, earlier data from Ethiopia Demographic and 
Health Survey (EDHS) indicate that the average household size (persons per 
household) increased from 4.8 in 2000 to 5 in 2005. The data also show that while the 
total fertility rate declined from 6.4 to 5.5 (by about one child per woman) between 1990 
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and 2000, the pace of decline dropped off subsequently. The total fertility rate declined 
only from 5.5 in 2000 to 5.4 in 2005. This slow down in reducing total fertility rate was 
primarily because of little change in rural fertility (Macro International Inc., 2007). 
 
The general shift in the view of policymakers on the population-development debate 
may have some concrete theoretical and empirical foundations. For Ethiopia (a country 
listed among the top countries with concerns of high fertility rates), however, it demands 
firm evidence to push population issues to the periphery. The fact is that no such 
evidence justifying the neglect of population growth in policy arena exists. Even with the 
remarkable attention the country is apparently paying to “statistical success” (as a tool 
for convincing others of our “sustained development”), quantitative data and references 
to empirical researches on population-development link hardly appear in governmental 
reports and policy papers. While statistics (or numbers) have undoubtedly played a 
significant role in our “development achievements”, our neglect of population matters 
has not benefitted from “statistical successes”. Nor do we have meaningful efforts made 
to deal with the demographic challenges of the country. Ethiopia has never revisited its 
population policy since the one written in 1993. Ringheim et al. (2009) have pointed out 
this weakness while discussing the window of opportunities the country could enjoy. 
 
Given the remarkable contrast between the demographic situation and the importance 
attached to population matters in policymaking, this study pursued the general objective 
of assessing the causal relationship between population and economic development in 
Ethiopia. Specifically, it tried to evaluate the direction and strength of the link between 
the growth of population and its components on one side and GDP per capita on the 
other. Besides, it attempted to assess the association between population growth and 
human development index (HDI) and highlight the pressure of population growth on 
agricultural land and forest coverage of the country. The study generally covered the 
period from 1950 to 2011. However, availability of data on some variables limited the 
coverage of some sections and/or sub-sections to shorter time spans. 
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
Types and Sources of Data  
 
The study utilized secondary data comprising of time series observations over the 
period 1950 to 2011. These data were obtained from published reports and online 
databases of the Central Statistical Authority (CSA) and the Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Development (MoFED) of Ethiopia; the World Bank; World Population 
Prospects and World Fertility Policies of the United Nations (UN); World Development 
Report of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); the State of World 
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Population of the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA); Penn World Tables of 
Heston et al. (2011). 
 
Model Specification 
 
The logical starting point for evaluating the cause-effect relationship between population 
and economic performance lies in establishing a theoretical link between the two. In this 
regard, the common practice is to employ the growth rate (or size) of total population for 
the former and the growth rate (or size) of GDP per capita for the later. Using size or 
growth rate of total population, however, ignores the heterogeneity within the population 
in terms of age (dependants versus independents) and economic activity (those in the 
labor force as employed or unemployed versus those economically inactive) among 
others. Two hypothetical countries identical in all aspects (including population size), 
except that one has more of its population in the labor force and lower rate of 
unemployment than the other does, are not expected to show the same relationship 
between demographic and economic variables. Dissatisfaction with the use of a single 
measure of demographic factors – size or growth rate of total population – has led to the 
examination of various aspects of the demographic side of the equation. Bloom et al. 
(2001), Yousif (2009), Prettner and Prskawetz (2010) are among works calling attention 
to the need for and the significance of such a shift. 
 
Consequently, disaggregating the effect of population growth into the effects of 
population (size or growth rate) in various age groups – most notably into dependent 
and working-age populations – emerged. Besides, considering birth rates and death 
rates separately instead of population growth rate has also joined the literature in the 
area. Kelley and Schmidt (1995) is one of the works forerunning both such practices. 
They have found significantly differing conclusions on population-development debate 
arising just from using traditional measures of demography or the disaggregated ones.   
 
In line with these arguments, this study experimented with the inclusion of the size and 
growth rate of total population, of workers (or employment), and of dependents. As a 
starting point, it assessed the relationship between each of these three demographic 
variables on the one hand and real GDP per capita on the other in the setting of 
bivariate analysis. Lack of sufficient data on birth and death rates did not permit 
separate treatment of these variables. 
 
Subsequently, after examining the direction and strength of the association among GDP 
per capita, population growth and employment growth, the study assessed if the 
inclusion of other variables alter the relationship established in the preceding steps. 
Drawing on the literature, the commonly appearing potential factors include investment 
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(gross capital formation), exports, imports, foreign direct investment and foreign aid. 
Given the small size of the time series data available relative to the requirement of the 
estimation techniques (specified after a while), the number of variables should be 
restricted. Accordingly, the choice of covariates in the regression equations depended 
on the length of the time span for which data are available. For instance, the variables 
fiscal deficit, foreign direct investment, foreign aid and depreciation of capital did not join 
the analysis on grounds of data availability. Besides, the variables imports, dependency 
ratio and population density were dropped after tests of stationary proved them to be of 
different order of integration. Moreover, the statistical performance of the estimates from 
VAR and VEC models has been well-studied and well-established for models with a few 
number of variables (Moneta et al., 2011).  
 
Hence, the estimation of and tests about the relationship between demographic and 
economic variables involved the following six variables:  
RGDPPC = Real GDP per capita (as a measure of economic performance); 
POPGR = population growth rate (change in natural logarithm of population size);  
EMPLGR = growth rate of total employment (change in ln(number of workers)); 
OPEN = Openness (measured by the sum of exports and imports over GDP); 
HUMAN = Human capital (government‟s health and education expenditure 
consumed by households); 
INVEST = Domestic Investment (gross capital formation); 
 
All these variables, measured at constant 2005 International Dollars (using chain series) 
are from Heston et al. (2011). Two of these variables are growth rates while the 
remaining four are in their levels (or log-levels). The order of integration of these 
variables assisted the choice between their levels (or log-levels) and growth rates. 
Besides, models with regime dummies (1950 – 1973, 1974 – 1991, 1992 – 2009) were 
estimated. 
 
Methods of Data Analysis  
 
This study relied on both descriptive statistics and econometric techniques. Under the 
descriptive analysis, numbers showing absolute sizes and changes, percentages, 
ratios, and growth rates – summarized in tables and graphs – were used to show the 
relationship between various measures of economic performance and measures of 
population dynamics.  
 
The econometric analysis involved estimation of vector error correction models 
(VECMs) without a priori assumption of exogeneity on any variable. The regressions of 
the VECMs were run on sets of variables to simultaneously look for the existence of 
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(and establish the direction of causality for) short-run relationships among stationary (or 
I(0)) variables and co-integrating (long-run) relationships among difference-stationary 
(or I(1)) variables. Accordingly, the following set of regression equations was estimated: 
iptp2t21t11tt εΔYΓ...ΔYΓΔYΓα.ECTΔY  
 
where:   tttttt INVESTHUMANOPENEMPLGRPOPGRRGDPPC                tΔY  
Γi s (i = 1, 2, …, p) are matrices of short run parameters; 
α is a matrix of adjustment parameters (reflecting dynamics towards equilibrium); 
1t1t βYECT  
 
is a matrix of error correction terms (with β a matrix of long-run 
parameters capturing co-integrating relationships among variables); 
t = time period (that is, year taking values 1, 2, 3 …); 
∆ = difference (for example, ∆RGDPPCt = RGDPPCt – RGDPPCt-1); and 
i = lag running from 1 (one year back) up to p (the maximum lag); respectively.  
 
Moreover, dummy variables for regimes (Derg = 1 between 1974 and 1991 and = 0 
elsewhere; EPRDF = 0 before 1992 and =1 then after) were included into the regression 
equation. 
 
As VEC models demand the order of integration of the variables, the first task was 
testing for the stationarity of the variables. Two tests of unit-root/stationarity served this 
purpose: the Generalized-Least-Squares transformed Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(DFGLS) test, and the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test. The DFGLS test 
was preferred to the commonly used Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test as the former 
accounts for the presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The DFGLS test 
also performs better that the Phillips-Perron (PP) test, another test which accounts for 
the presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (StataCorp, 2009). The study 
used the KPSS test to complement the DFGLS test; the order of integration of a 
variable was inferred from the agreement of the conclusions of the two tests. Such a 
role for the KPSS test to complement other tests (as the DFGLS test here) was 
established on the ground that this test has the null hypothesis of stationary series as 
opposed to others with the null of unit root in the series (Baum, 2000).  
 
Where the two tests – DFGLS and KPSS – happened to choose different lag lengths, 
each test was conducted at lag lengths chosen by both tests. For instance, in testing for 
the stationarity of ln(RGDPPC), the DFGLS test chose 1 as the optimal lag length while 
the KPSS test chose lag 2. Then, the stationarity of ln(RGDPPC) was tested using both 
DFGLS and KPSS tests at both lags. Consensus among these four tests was needed to 
conclude the order of integration of the variable. In cases of disagreement, higher level 
differencing was tried until consensus is reached.  
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To test for stationarity and to estimate VEC models, this study has used Schwarz‟s 
Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC), Hannan and Quinn Information Criterion (HQIC), 
Akaike‟s Information Criterion (AIC), and Final Prediction Error (FPE) for determining 
the optimal lag. In cases of disagreement among these criteria, the lag length preferred 
by each criterion was checked. In testing for the rank of co-integration, Johansen‟s 
likelihood ratio (LR) test – using both trace and maximum statistics – was employed, 
supplemented by the usual SBIC and HQIC. When two/ more models (differing by trend 
specification or lag length) passed all pre-estimation tests, post-estimations tests 
(VECM-stability, autocorrelation in error terms, and stationarity of the co-integrating 
equation) assisted for discriminating between/among the qualifying models. 
 
The statistical package used to handle most of the tests and estimations is Stata 
(version 11.0). The components of Stata necessary for undertaking the KPSS test of 
stationarity that are not part of the official Stata 11.0 version, authored by Christopher F. 
Baum, were downloaded from the website of the Stata-community. The tests and 
estimations of models involving dummy variables were conducted with the help of 
JMulTi (version 4.23). 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
This section deals with the presentation and analyses of data on the trend and 
components of population dynamics, and its relationship with measures of economic 
performance, namely, trends of HDI, changes in arable land, forest coverage and 
agricultural landholdings, and real GDP per capita. 
 
Trend and Components of Population Dynamics 
 
As World Bank (2010) data depict, with a total population of around 22.6 million in 1960, 
Ethiopia experienced a population blast that resulted in more than 82.8 million people 
by 2009. Indeed, the population size doubled between 1985 and 2009 – signifying a 
doubling time of about 24 years. According to United Nations prediction (UN, 2011a), a 
total population ranging from 98.768 million (under the low-fertility scenario) to 108.059 
million (under the constant-fertility scenario) will inhabit Ethiopia by the year 2020. Only 
under the hope of medium or low fertility is the population of Ethiopia projected to have 
a turning point before the year 2100 (after reaching 157.908 million in 2075 and 126.514 
million in 2056 under the medium and low fertility scenarios, respectively).  
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Figure 1: Size, growth rate and absolute change in size of total population: 1960 – 2009 
Source: Constructed Based on Data from World Bank (2010) 
 
 
      Figure 2: Population growth rate and the rate of natural increase: 1960 – 2009 
      Source: Constructed Based on Data from World Bank (2010) 
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Though the total population size was increasing over time (and is likely to do so for 
some decades to come), it seemed that the rate at which population size rises has 
currently stabilized at about 2.6 percent per annum (UN, 2011a). However, there is no 
consensus among different sources on this story of population growth rate stabilizing 
around 2.6%. The data from Heston et al. (2011) indicated the rate of population growth 
to be 3.2 percent in 2009; it shared the stabilizing story of the UN though. 
 
While this slow down in the speed of population dynamics could be encouraging, it is far 
from suggesting that Ethiopia overcame the population problem. With so many millions 
of people already on the ground, more and more millions will subsequently be 
welcomed every year – exposing the concern of population momentum. For instance, 
while the rate of population growth dropped from about 3.4 percent in 1992 to about 
2.58 percent in 2009, the absolute change in population size rose from about 1.73 
million extra people in 1992 to about 2.11 million extra people in 2009 (Figure 1). 
 
The particular pattern taken by variables in Figure 1 hinges on the rate of natural 
increase (i.e., the difference between birth rate and death rate) and the rate of net 
migration (the difference between immigration and emigration rates). Perhaps due to its 
relatively smaller contribution to population growth, and poor and discontinuous data, 
international migration usually takes a subsidiary position in discussions of population 
dynamics. In fact, the comparison between the rate of population growth and the rate of 
natural increase revealed that the two rates generally behave similarly (Figure 2). 
 
However, this could not justify the ignorance of migration in analyzing population 
dynamics. For instance, the deep valley in population growth rate in the 1970s was 
neither because of a sudden drop in birth rate nor due to a sudden climb in death rate. 
The crude birth rate and the crude death rate (more importantly the difference between 
them) were generally stable. Thus, the divergence between the two rates shown in 
Figure 2 is indicative of the role international migration played in explaining population 
dynamics. Though year-by-year data are not available on international migration, the 
five-year average data on net immigration from UN (2011a) gives a picture very 
consistent with the divergence between the two series in Figure 2. 
 
Political instability associated with the 1974 revolution was perhaps the most apparent 
phenomenon that explains the unusually important place of international migration. The 
radical shift in ideology of the government from Western-oriented feudalism to socialism 
and the subsequent „Nech Shibir‟ – „Qey Shibir‟ (to mean White Terror – Red Terror) 
“urban-guerrilla warfare” (Keller, 2008), inter alia, might had induced a significant 
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number of emigrants. The subsequent reversal in the net migration (during 1980–1985) 
was possibly due to emigrants returning home after relative stability came to the country 
as Mengistu Hailemariam effectively eliminated all his political opponents. The return of 
negative net immigration in the 1990s was also likely to be the result of political 
insatiability following the change of regime in 1991. 
 
Even if international migration has had a significant influence, the components of natural 
increase – fertility and mortality – were by far the main actors in population dynamics of 
the country. World Bank (2010) data indicate the following. For the period from 1960 to 
2008, the crude birth and death rates of the country averaged 45.72 births and 18.68 
deaths per 1000 people respectively. While this implied an average rate of natural 
increase equal to 27.04 per 1000 people, the rate of net immigration was relatively 
immaterial (averaged – 0.59 per 1000 people between 1960 and 2010).  
 
The crude birth and death rates were above the average rates for sub-Saharan Africa. 
For the period 1980–2008, for which data for comparison were available, the crude birth 
rate of Ethiopia (44.7 births per 1000 people) was above the average for sub-Saharan 
Africa (42.9). Similarly, the average crude death rate (16.6) was above the 
corresponding average for sub-Saharan Africa (15.8). The gap in death rate between 
Ethiopia and sub-Saharan Africa (and developing countries as a group) was narrower 
than the gap in birth rates. Thus, while reducing mortality remains a concern of 
development policy, the relatively high birth rate seems to be of a more critical panic.  
 
Nevertheless, in its World Fertility Policies, UN (2011b) describes Ethiopia as a country 
with a major government concern about the high level of adolescent fertility but with no 
policy to reduce it. Contraceptive prevalence rate (for any method) was as low as 15% 
and unmet need for family planning was as high as 34% (both figures in 2005). This 
combination suggested that there exists a huge gap for policy action. Besides solving 
the huge unmet need for family planning, government should have tried to create 
awareness among those who did not know about family planning.  
 
Despite the drop in fertility and mortality rates, as both fertility and mortality were very 
high even by standards of sub-Saharan Africa, it looks that Ethiopia was just around the 
end of the second stage or around the start of the final stage of demographic transition. 
It might take many years before fertility and mortality rates experience sharp falls and 
population growth stabilizes at a very low rate. The fact that population growth rate will 
remain high for sometime even after fertility and mortality rates fall sharply adds to the 
time length needed for the accomplishment of demographic transition. 
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The age structure of the Ethiopian population looked very crucial to the persistence of 
high population growth rate into the future. Figure 3 presents the population pyramid of 
Ethiopia by gender and age cohorts. With most of the population at the bottom of the 
pyramid, the population momentum is surely to continue far into the future, a fact that 
warns us against being proud of the recently observed fall in population growth rate. 
 
While the age distribution of the population discussed above generally characterizes 
developing countries with high fertility and high mortality, these figures for Ethiopia were 
somewhat disgusting. Table 1 compares the percentage shares of the Ethiopian 
population in different age groups (averaged over the years 1980 to 2009) to the 
corresponding average shares of the world and major developing regions of the world. 
 
As shown in Table 1, the share of children aged 0 to 14 years in the Ethiopian 
population was by far above the world average. In fact, the proportion of Ethiopia‟s 
youth was above the average for any developing region in the world. In contrast, 
Ethiopia had the smallest share of the working age population as well as the elderly as 
compared to any developing region of the world and the world as a whole.   
 
 
     Figure 3: Population pyramid of Ethiopia by sex 
     Source: Constructed Based on Data from CSA (2007) 
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Table 1: Population Distribution by Age Group: Ethiopia Compared to Different Regions 
Country/Region Share of Population in Age Group 
0 – 14 15 – 64 65 and above 
Ethiopia 45.04 52.04 2.92 
East Asia and Pacific (Developing Countries) 29.30 65.00 5.70 
Latin America and Caribbean (Developing Countries) 34.19 60.47 5.34 
Least Developed Countries 43.30 53.59 3.11 
Low Income Countries 42.58 54.18 3.24 
Middle East and North Africa (Developing Countries) 39.47 56.66 3.86 
Sub-Saharan Africa (Developing Countries) 44.52 52.51 2.98 
World 31.53 61.96 6.51 
Source: Constructed Based on Data from World Bank (2010)  
 
Inherent in such an age distribution, Ethiopia had a higher dependency ratio compared 
to most parts of the world. From the latest data of CSA (CSA, 2007), the age-
dependency-ratio was around 93 percent. That is, under an extremely hypothetical 
scenario where everyone in the working age is working, a group of 100 working-age 
people should support extra 93 people (a total of 193 people). Under the actual situation 
where about 25.6 percent of the working-age population was inactive (CSA, 2007), 
about 20.5 percent of the labor force was unemployed (World Bank, 2010), and the 
majority of those employed – around 80% – were found in low productivity subsistence 
agriculture (Gete et al., 2007), the dependency ratio may have understated the burden. 
 
Population Growth and Human Development Index 
 
The effect of population growth on the economic performance of a country or a region is 
also reflected in changing HDI, which is designed to particularly reflect long-term 
changes in human development as opposed to short-term fluctuations. HDI comprises 
of measures of achievement in education, in health as well as decent standard of living.  
 
The difficulty with analyzing the performance of the country with respect to HDI was that 
data on HDI in a single report (source) do not cover many years, and this was coupled 
with incomparability of data from reports of different years. Observations of HDI from 
UNDP (2011) and population growth rate from World Bank (2010) indicated a negative 
association between the two. Ethiopia, found at the bottom of Figure 4(A) showing HDI 
scores, turned out to be at the top of Figure 4(B) showing the rate of population growth. 
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Figure 4: Ethiopia compared to various groups of countries based on (A) HDI score 
and (B) population growth rate. 
Source: Constructed Based on Data from UNDP (2011) and World Bank (2010) 
 
In terms of growth, Ethiopia‟s HDI grew by about 27.9 percent between 2000 and 2011, 
at a faster rate than that of the other groups (Figure 4(A)). If this pattern continues into 
the future, there is a room for hope to catch up with these groups. However, this should 
not be exaggerated as a change from a small initial value yields a huge growth rate. 
Despite its position towards the bottom of the HDI rank list, UNDP (2010) put Ethiopia 
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among the top movers in their HDI. In the report, Ethiopia was the eleventh top improver 
in the past forty years in terms of HDI and the eighth in terms of non-income HDI. UNDP 
attributed this improvement mainly to big gains made in education and public health.  
 
As to the big gains made in education, I argue that the gain has been in numbers at the 
expense of quality. During our early school days, we used to consider spelling our 
names correctly as the first success. The recent phenomenon, however, is very horrible. 
The number of tertiary level students who do not spell their names correctly is not trivial. 
I had personally witnessed students who spell their names differently on question 
papers and answer sheets. It was more awful to see master‟s students (among the 
better off and chosen to be university instructors) calculating firm profit as the difference 
between average revenue and marginal cost, after following the course Managerial 
Economics for four months. Such observations had been common and too many to list. 
However, the reflection these observations give to our “big educational achievements” is 
very crucial. Though such facts may not be enough to deny achievements in education, 
they should warn us against dancing too much in celebrations. 
 
Population Growth and Pressure on Land 
 
Another important area that reflects the effects of population growth is the pressure on 
natural resources like land and forests. With a rapidly increasing population, the 
demands for agricultural land and for energy sources would cause deforestation for 
expanding agricultural land and drive down the size of arable land per person and forest 
coverage. Besides, such a pressure induces movement to previously uncultivable land. 
Such population-induced movement to marginal land is unlikely to be a lasting solution 
since the continued population explosion will eventually inevitably lead to a situation 
where such a movement becomes impossible.   
 
As Figure 5 shows, per capita land holding fell in sharp contrast to the rising absolute 
change in population size particularly since 1998. Just between 1993 and 2007, a 
person lost about 0.6 hectares of land on average. Similarly, per capita holding of arable 
land also showed an overall decline between 1993 and 2007. However, unlike the down 
trending land-to-man ratio, there were times of rise in arable land per capita. The rising 
parts of per capita arable land holdings were associated with rising share of arable land. 
The implication is that parts of the originally non-arable land were subsequently being 
cultivated. This fact did not imply any ease in the pressure on land resources. Indeed, 
per capita holding of arable land was better in 1993 (with about 10 million hectares of 
arable land) than in 2007 (with about 14.038 million hectares of arable land). It could 
only signify that the ever-expanding population of the nation was moving into marginal 
lands and would be increasingly engaged in activities like deforestation. 
17 
 
 
Figure 5: Population change and the pressure on land 
Source: Constructed Based on Data from World Bank (2010) 
 
Figure 5 also depicts the contrasting trends taken by population change and forest 
coverage of the country, especially since 1998. Again, in sharp contrast to the trend of 
population change, the share of forestland in total land area was declining sharply. 
Forest coverage fell by about 14.4 percent in fourteen years. 
 
To sum up, the descriptive analysis showed that population growth rate is negatively 
associated with per capita land holding, forest coverage and HDI. However, such 
associations do not establish causality, the concern of the remainder of this section. 
 
Population and Real GDP per Capita: An Econometric Analysis 
 
This sub-section presents the econometric investigation of the relationship between 
population and income. While each report of UNDP has some observations of HDI, the 
fact that these are not comparable across reports prohibited using HDI in regression. 
 
Tests of stationarity occupy the first step in time series econometrics. Accordingly, the 
DFGLS and KPSS tests were applied to real GDP per capita, total population, 
18 
 
population density, employment, dependency ratio, domestic investment, human capital 
and openness. Table 2 summarizes the results. 
 
Real GDP per capita, investment, human capital and openness are non-stationary in 
levels and log-levels, but stationary in differences and log-differences. Thus, each of 
these variables is I(1) while their differences and log-differences are I(0). For ease of 
interpretation, log-differences of these variables were preferred to differences.  
 
Regarding the demographic variables, there were some disagreements between the 
two tests. Total population and employment both appeared to be stationary in their log-
differences but only around trend. However, as the other variables were stationary 
without trend, forms of these variables passing stationary without trend were sought for. 
Testing for non-trend stationarity revealed that population and employment (both in 
logs) are integrated of order two, translating into their growth rates being I(1). 
 
  
19 
 
Table 2: DFGLS and KPSS Unit Root Test Results 
 
Variable 
 
Form 
DFGLS test KPSS test 
with trend without trend with trend without trend 
Population Level 0.514 [5] -1.323 [2] 0.559 [2]*** 2.21 [2]*** 
  log-level 0.203 [2] -0.062 [9] 0.573 [2]*** 2.34 [2]*** 
  Difference -3.209 [1]** -1.562 [1] 0.244 [3]*** 1.89 [2]*** 
  log-difference -6.855 [1]*** -0.626 [4] 0.0197 [2] 1.35 [2]*** 
RGDPPC Level -1.349 [2] 1.889 [1] 0.227 [2]*** 0.878 [2]*** 
  log-level -1.029 [1] 1.410 [1] 0.262 [2]*** 0.931 [2]*** 
  Difference -2.560 [1] -2.13 [1]** 0.249 [2]*** 0.301 [2] 
  log-difference -2.883 [1]* -2.040 [1]** 0.206 [3]** 0.206 [3] 
INVEST Level -3.056 [1]* -1.515 [1] 0.147 [2]** 1.14 [2]*** 
  log-level -2.057 [1] -0.498 [1] 0.261 [2]*** 1.28 [2]*** 
  Difference -5.544 [2]*** -5.915 [2]*** 0.0361 [2] 0.0417 [2] 
  log-difference -4.154 [1]*** -2.990 [1]***  0.0771[3] 0.22 [3] 
Employment Level -0.787 [1] 1.354 [1] 0.513 [2]*** 2.12 [2]*** 
  log-level -0.309 [1] 1.428 [1] 0.523 [2]*** 2.28 [2]*** 
  Difference -2.098 [1] 0.583 [2] 0.352 [2]*** 1.76 [2]*** 
  log-difference -4.640 [1]*** -2.539 [1]** 0.0945 [2] 1.41 [2]*** 
Dependency Level -2.222 [2] -1.381 [1] 0.341 [2]*** 1.18 [2]*** 
      Ratio log-level -2.186 [2] -1.683 [2]* 0.349 [2]*** 1.18 [2]*** 
  Difference -2.031 [1] -1.733 [1]* 0.225 [2]*** 0.837 [2]*** 
  log-difference -1.996 [1] -1.683 [1]* 0.23 [2]*** 0.879 [2]*** 
HUMAN Level -1.564 [1] 0.595 [1] 0.352 [2]*** 1.85 [2]*** 
  log-level -2.761 [1] 0.932 [1] 0.124 [2]* 2.19 [2]*** 
  Difference -5.691 [1]*** -5.449 [1]*** 0.0399 [2] 0.2 [2] 
  log-difference -5.921 [1]*** -5.582 [1]*** 0.0387 [2] 0.0391 [2] 
OPEN  Level -1.113 [1] 1.233 [1] 0.206 [2]** 1.37 [2]** 
  log-level -1.114 [1] 1.137 [1] 0.287 [2]*** 1.47 [2]*** 
  Difference -4.399 [1]*** -4.099 [1]*** 0.164 [3]** 0.176 [3] 
  log-difference -4.158 [1]*** -1.901 [2]* 0.153 [3]** 0.183 [3] 
EMPLGR Level -4.640 [1]*** -2.539 [1]** 0.0945 [2] 1.41 [2]*** 
  log-level -5.111 [1]*** -2.777 [1]*** 0.0737 [2] 1.45 [2]*** 
  Difference -6.499 [1]*** -5.076 [1]*** 0.0288 [3] 0.0369 [3] 
  log-difference -6.035 [1]*** -3.798 [1]*** 0.0303 [3] 0.0381 [3] 
POPGR Level -6.855 [1]*** -0.626  [4] 0.0197 [2] 1.35 [2]*** 
  log-level -6.180 [3]*** -0.448 [4] 0.0228 [2] 1.37 [2]*** 
  Difference -5.948 [7]*** -5.982 [7]***  0.0144 [2] 0.0144 [2] 
  log-difference -7.639 [3]*** -7.635 [3]*** 0.0145 [2] 0.0145 [2] 
Note: Numbers in [ ] are optimal lags for the test; and (2) *, ** and *** show rejection of the null hypothesis 
at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. 
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Population density, another demographic variable, is non-stationary in all the four forms. 
Through subsequent tests for higher order of integration, it was found to be integrated of 
order two in its log, meaning that its growth rate was an I(1) variable. Stationarity for 
dependency ratio could not be secured up to three orders. However, this is unlikely to 
create any problem since total population after controlling for employment (number of 
workers), captures the effect of the dependent population. 
 
In sum, the tests of stationarity indicated that the following variables were I(1), with the 
potential for co-integrating relationship(s): GDP per capita, domestic investment, human 
capital, openness, population growth rate, and growth rate of employment. 
 
The next step was to assess the relationship among the variables in the short run and 
the long run. Accordingly, Johansen‟s test of co-integration amongst the I(1) variables 
was checked, first in bivariate and then in multivariate settings. In the bivariate case, the 
test involved the pairs RGDPPC and POPGR, and RGDPPC and EMPLGR.  
 
With regard to the relationship between POPGR and RGDPPC, SBIC, FPE and HQIC 
chose lag 1 while AIC chose lag 2 as the optimal lag when tested with constant both in 
the differenced VAR model and in the co-integrating equation. With trend in the co-
integrating equation as well as with trend in both the differenced VAR and the co-
integrating equation, all the information criteria chose lag 2, with the exception of SBIC 
(which chose lag 1). Consensus between Johansen‟s test and Saikkonen and Lütkepohl 
test led to concluding the existence of a co-integrating relation and choosing the models 
with trend in the co-integrating equation. While AIC, FPE and HQIC all favored the 
model with 2 lags, SBIC chose lag 1. The choice between these two models called in 
the tests for stability and stationarity of the co-integrating equation, and test for 
autocorrelation in the error terms. Accordingly, the model with 2 lags and trend in the 
co-integration equation only was chosen. 
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Table 3: Estimation Results of the Bivariate VECM of ln(RGDPPC) and POPGR 
 
Regressors ↓ Dependent Variable 
∆ln(RGDPPC) ∆POPGR 
        ECTt-1 – 0.031  (0.011) – 0.006  (0.000) 
        ∆ln(RGDPPC)t-1 – 0.287  (0.018)    0.017  (0.065) 
        ∆ln(RGDPPC)t-2    0.076  (0.538)    0.016  (0.085) 
        ∆POPGRt-1    2.069  (0.191)    0.588  (0.000) 
        ∆POPGRt-2    5.158  (0.002)    0.187  (0.138) 
        DERG  – 0.046  (0.014)  – 0.0004  (0.797) 
        EPRDF  – 0.007  (0.724)  – 0.005  (0.001) 
        Constant    0.290  (0.006)    0.051  (0.000) 
ECT = ln(RGDPPC) – 0.073*Trend + 181.039*POPGR 
                                         (.)               (0.000)                (0.000) 
Note: Numbers in ( ) are p-values. This holds for Tables 4 and 5 as well. 
 
In the co-integrating equation, the coefficient of ln(RGDPPC) was normalized to one. 
The alternative of normalizing the coefficient of population growth rate yielded 
unreasonable estimates of adjustment parameters, and hence dropped. According to 
the result in Table 3, there existed a negative long run relationship between per capita 
income and population growth rate. The ∆ln(RGDPPC) equation exhibits a yearly 
adjustment of about 3.1% to disequilibrium in the long run relationship. The ∆POPGR 
equation, on the other hand, corrects about 0.6% of disequilibrium in a year. As both 
equations in the VECM have statistically significant adjustment parameters (reflected in 
small p-values), the long run causality runs in both directions: higher rate of population 
growth hampers the level of per capita income, and higher level of per capita income 
reduces the rate of population growth. Moreover, the growth rate of GDP per capita 
during the Derg regime was significantly below that of the Imperial regime. Similarly 
EPRDF experienced by reduced changes in population growth rate than the Imperial. 
 
There is unidirectional causality in the short run – only population growth granger-
caused real GDP per capita. As the Orthogonal Impulse Response Functions (OIRFs) 
suggest a stabilized causality in opposite direction materials only after a lag of 16 years. 
 
Investigating the bivariate relationships between growth rate of employment and real 
GDP per capita followed, repeating steps paralleling the forerunning investigation. In 
this case, AIC and FPE favored lag 1 as the optimal lag while HQIC and SBIC chose lag 
0. As both variables have been proved to be I(1), the former is taken. Agreement 
between the two tests of co-integration favored two models – one with and the other 
without trend in the co-integrating relationship. The trend term is found to be 
insignificant and dropped. Table 4 presents the VECM estimation result. 
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Table 4: Estimation Results of the Bivariate VECM of ln(RGDPPC) and EMPLGR 
Regressors ↓ 
Dependent Variable 
∆ln(RGDPPC) ∆EMPLGR 
        ECTt-1 – 0.655  (0.611)   – 0.762  (0.000) 
        ∆ln(RGDPPC)t-1 – 0.361  (0.003)     0.005  (0.691) 
        ∆EMPLGRt-1    0.136  (0.908)     0.315  (0.011) 
        DERG – 0.001  (0.016)     0.0002  (0.005) 
        EPRDF    0.001  (0.193)     0.0002  (0.000) 
       Constant – 0.020  (0.830)     – 0.054  (0.000) 
ECT = EMPLGR – 0.015ln(RGDPPC) 
                              (0.106) 
  
Hence, there exists a positive long run relationship between per capita income and 
growth rate of employment. In this case, causality is unidirectional: from income per 
capita to growth of employment. Whenever the system is above or below the long run 
equilibrium, the only responsive variable – ∆EMPLGR – will take the system back to 
equilibrium. The speed of adjustment is about 76% per year. The regime dummies 
(which show trend shifts, as opposed to level shifts in Table 3) indicate that both the 
Derg and EPRDF regimes are better in terms of employment growth while the Derg 
regime is worse in terms income growth than the Imperial regime.  
 
In the short run, neither the growth of employment granger-causes per capita income 
nor per capita income granger-causes the growth rate of employment. That is, short run 
changes in employment growth result from exogenous shocks to itself or from 
disequilibrium in the system and not directly from short run changes in GDP per capita. 
The OIRFs also suggest a weak (at 10% significance level) long-run unidirectional 
causality running from income to employment growth. 
 
Next, a VECM of three variables – ln(RGDPPC), POPGR and EMPLGR – was 
estimated. Pre- and post-estimation tests and the information criteria used earlier, 
chose the model with four lags and trend in the co-integrating equation. Despite 
differences in the numerical values, two long run causalities – a negative one running 
from population growth to per capita income and a positive one running from income to 
employment growth – are intact (see the OIRFs). Besides, now employment growth 
happens to granger-cause population growth positively (perhaps through the better 
prospect employment entails encouraging marriage and birth).  
 
Of the long run relationships found previously, the one running from income to 
population growth looks broken. Though inference from OIRFs suggests this, the 
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significance of the error correction term (ECTt-1) in the POPGR equation reveals that 
population growth is endogenous to the system. Thus, if income is large or employment 
growth is slow (or some combination of the two), the system will be above equilibrium 
and population growth must fall as the system gravitates back to equilibrium. However, 
as the speed of adjustment for this variable is very small (1% a year), its movement 
towards the equilibrium might be veiled (particularly by that of income). 
 
Table 5: Estimation Results of the VECM of ln(RGDPPC), POPGR and EMPLGR 
Regressors ↓ Dependent Variable 
∆ln(RGDPPC) ∆POPGR ∆EMPLGR 
        ECTt-1 – 0.115  (0.000) – 0.010  (0.001) – 0.009  (0.014) 
        ∆ln(RGDPPC)t-1 – 0.508 (0.000)    0.016  (0.150)    0.021  (0.141) 
        ∆ln(RGDPPC)t-2    – 0.052 (0.648)    0.027  (0.013)    0.029  (0.041) 
        ∆ln(RGDPPC)t-3    0.044 (0.708)    0.020  (0.069)    0.027  (0.061) 
        ∆ln(RGDPPC)t-4    – 0.155 (0.188)    0.007  (0.536)    0.020  (0.171) 
        ∆POPGRt-1    15.274 (0.001)    0.901  (0.032)    1.383  (0.013) 
        ∆POPGRt-2    23.127 (0.000)    0.292  (0.451)    0.518  (0.310) 
        ∆POPGRt-3    16.951 (0.000)    0.168  (0.639)  – 0.085  (0.858) 
        ∆POPGRt-4    10.313 (0.001)    – 0.182  (0.548)  – 0.319  (0.425) 
        ∆EMPLGRt-1 – 7.896 (0.001) – 0.374 (0.108) – 0.834 (0.007) 
        ∆EMPLGRt-2 – 13.584 (0.000) – 0.232 (0.349) – 0.479 (0.144) 
        ∆EMPLGRt-3 – 12.724 (0.000) – 0.071 (0.784)    0.226  (0.506) 
        ∆EMPLGRt-4 – 7.468 (0.003) – 0.012 (0.960)    0.159  (0.603) 
        EPRDF    0.001 (0.931) – 0.003 (0.078)  – 0.001  (0.275) 
        DERG   – 0.057 (0.016)    0.002 (0.002)   0.003  (0.002) 
        Constant    0.928 (0.000) – 0.075  (0.001) – 0.071  (0.016) 
ECT = ln(RGDPPC) – 0.032*Trend – 58.557*EMPLGR + 166.73*POPGR 
                                          (.)            (0.000)                 (0.000)                    (0.000) 
 
With regard to short run granger-causality, GDP per capita is exogenous consistent with 
earlier bivariate analyses. It takes more six years before GDP per capita affects 
employment growth sustainably and more than five decades before it affects population 
growth directly and significantly. 
 
Finally, the VECM with non-demographic variables included was estimated. Repeating 
similar procedures as before, a model with two lags and a constant in the co-integrating 
equation won overall preference. While SBIC and HQIC chose lag 0 as the optimal lag, 
AIC and FPE chose lag 2. As lag 0 implies static regression (but the variables are non-
stationary), the model with lag 2 was chosen. With openness, domestic investment, and 
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two regime dummies included in addition to population growth, employment growth, and 
ln(RGDPPC), there existed a meaningful long run relationship among these variables.  
 
Like the previous VECM results, the long run relationship in this equation revealed a 
negative association of bidirectional causality between per capita income and 
population growth. This is evident from the sign of the coefficient of POPGR in the co-
integrating equation and significance of the adjustment coefficients (Table 6). Thus, a 
slower (faster) population growth both raises (lowers) per capita income and results 
from a rise (fall) in per capita income. Similarly, there is a positive relationship between 
income per capita and growth of employment. That is, higher (lower) per capita income 
elevates (reduces) growth employment, which enhances the rise (fall) in per capita 
income. Furthermore, increase in domestic investment raises real GDP per capita and 
this in turn brings about a rise in domestic investment in the long run. 
 
Table 6: Estimation Results of the Full Multivariate VECM 
 Regressors ↓ 
Dependent Variable 
∆ln(RGDPPC) ∆ln(INVEST) ∆EMPLGR ∆POPGR ∆ln(OPEN) 
ECTt-1 -0.105
*** -0.333** -0.016*** -0.020*** -0.089 
∆ln(RGDPPC)t-1 -0.334
** 0.628 0.036** 0.034*** 1.008*** 
∆ln(RGDPPC)t-2 0.087 -0.937
* 0.002 0.017 0.001 
∆ln(INVEST)t-1 0.012 -0.368
** -0.008* -0.005 -0.265*** 
∆ln(INVEST)t-2 0.034 0.153 0.008
* 0.002 -0.114*** 
∆EMPLGRt-1 -2.813 4.774 -0.586
** -0.293 -0.959 
∆EMPLGRt-2 -5.728
*** -8.590 -0.551** -0.143 6.358* 
∆POPGRt-1 4.393 8.048 1.150
*** 0.942*** 6.717 
∆POPGRt-2 11.122
*** 17.385 0.611* 0.351 -1.825 
∆ln(OPEN)t-1 -0.006 0.0931
*** 0.010 0.006 0.037 
∆ln(OPEN)t-2 0.185
*** 0.351 -0.002 0.002 0.197* 
DERG -0.023 -0.046  0.003 0.003** -0.011 
EPRDF 0.054*** 0.005 0.005** 0.005*** -0.006 
Constant 0.059*** 0.228*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.076** 
ECT = ln(RGDPPC) – 0.181OPEN – 0.283ln(INVEST)*** – 28.048(EMPLGR) *** + 88.557(POPGR) ***. 
Note: *, ** and *** depict significance at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. 
 
Moreover, except openness that looks weakly exogenous, each variable in the co-
integrating equation is significantly caused by the other variables (in the long run). 
Regarding the regime dummies, significantly higher population growth rate 
characterizes the Derg-regime, and EPRDF has performed better in GDP per capita 
and employment growth but also with a higher population growth rate (both in 
comparison with the Imperial regime). 
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Granger-causality tests support lack of instantaneous causality running from openness 
and employment growth to the other variables. OIRFs were used to assess the 
dynamics of how shocks to each of the variables affect all the variables. The OIRFs for 
this full model show that an orthogonal shock to population growth will induce a 
significant reduction in per capita income (at 5% level) and openness (at 10% level) and 
a significant rise in employment growth with a lag of close to two decades (at 5% level). 
A shock to GDP per capita induces a slowdown in population growth rate with a lag of 
more than a decade and a half, and a permanent boost to itself. Though OIRFs support 
bidirectional causality between GDP per capita and population growth, causality from 
the latter to the former is stronger and robust to a number of alternative specifications.  
 
Shocks to employment growth enhance investment and population growth. Shocks to 
openness appear to have significant positive effects on GDP per capita and investment, 
and less significant positive effect on population and employment growth rates. Finally, 
shocks to investment appear not to have a significant effect on any other variable 
(except itself), though this is in contrast to the significant positive effect it had on income 
per capita suggested by the co-integrating equation. 
 
To sum up, there is a significant negative relationship between population growth and 
the economic performance of Ethiopia in the long run, but not in the short run. 
Significant and robust bidirectional causality characterizes the long run relationship 
between population growth and GDP per capita. The short run relationship between 
growth rate of GDP per capita and change of population growth, however, looks 
unidirectional (from population to income) but not robust to alternative specifications. 
Changes in sign and/or significance occur from one model to another. As the models 
have controlled for the growth of employment, this relationship between population 
growth and per capita income reflects the impacts of (and the effects on) the growth of 
the dependent population. The growth of employment has a positive and significant long 
run relationship with per capita income, with bidirectional causality. Again, the short run 
relationship is not robust to alternative model specifications.  
 
Regarding the other control variables, changes in openness have significant short run 
effects on growth rates of per capita income and domestic investment. There also exists 
positive long run causality running from domestic investment to per capita income. In 
the short run, growth of openness (international trade linkage) has significant influences 
on growth rate of income and changes in the growth rate of employment. Finally, growth 
of GDP per capita of the Dreg and EPRDF regimes are generally inferior and superior to 
that of the Imperial regime respectively; population growth has gone up for both. 
 
26 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
This paper examined the interrelationship between demographic variables and 
economic performance of Ethiopia. Using the VECM approach and controlling for 
openness, domestic investment and regime changes, it assessed the direction and 
strength of causality between the growth rates of population and workers on the one 
hand and the level of real GDP per capita on the other. Besides, it supplemented the 
econometric investigation with descriptive analysis highlighting the pressure of 
population change on the HDI, agricultural land and forest coverage of the country. 
 
The population of Ethiopia more than quadrupled in about six decades. Though there 
was some tendency of stabilizing/declining rate of population growth, this is far from an 
accomplishment as the absolute change in population continued to rise. With most of its 
population at the bottom of population pyramid, the working-age population accounted 
for slightly above half of the total. The share of children below the working-age in the 
Ethiopian population was by far above the world average and the average for any 
developing region. While the very high average rate of natural increase played the 
dominant role in shaping the demographic dynamics of Ethiopia, international migration 
also played significant roles particularly during periods of political instability. 
 
In contrast with the position of the country in terms of population growth, Ethiopia 
registered HDI scores that are by far less than even the average for low-human-
development countries. Despite some improvement in HDI, the rising numbers might 
have come at the expense of quality (especially in education). However, denying claims 
of improvements wholly might carry danger of political prejudice. Also evident from the 
descriptive analysis, population growth had inverse relationship with per capita land 
holding, total forest coverage, and HDI score of the country.  
 
The econometric analysis of the VECM relating population and real GDP per capita, 
suggested existence of bidirectional causality between demographic and economic 
variables. Rises in per capita income reduced the growth rate of population and 
enhanced the growth rate of employment, and vice versa. Similarly, slowed growth rate 
of the population and/or faster growth rate of employment enhanced the betterment of 
real income per person. Short run relationships were, however, not robust to alternative 
model specifications.  
 
All the findings point to a better attention – on the side of the government – to issues of 
population control and their incorporation into various national policies and policy-
debates. More specifically, concerned ministries and departments should do more in 
expanding the coverage of contraceptives among the population, particularly the rural 
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population that accounted for about 84% of the country‟s population. Secondly, efforts in 
areas such as microfinance should be encouraged and extended so that women would 
be economically empowered, and would subsequently have more saying in family 
decisions like fixing the desired family size. Finally, teaching the benefits of small family 
size particularly to the majority in the rural should be given due attention. 
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